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UNDERMINING KULKO AT HOME AND ABROAD 
JOHN J. SAMPSON* 
 
I. An Address to the Attendees of the Symposium** 
A. Bob and Me 
Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, students, professors, deans. 
My talk is entitled “Undermining Kulko at Home and Abroad.” Before I 
begin, however, I'd first like to say something about “Bob and me.” That 
phrase makes me think of one of my favorite books from when I was a boy-
-Ben and Me.1 I wishfully hoped that the book could mistakenly be thought 
to describe the relationship I have had with Bob Spector over the past 
fifteen years. The more I thought about it, though, the more I knew I was 
wrong. He certainly is the Ben Franklin in our relationship, but I am not the 
mouse. Rather, he was, and is, my mentor in international law; I am but his 
mentee in all things foreign.2 Coincidentally, Gloria DeHart is here in the 
audience today to celebrate Bob’s career; as he noted earlier, she was his 
mentor on this same subject.3 Further, she was the person who taught me on 
how to adapt the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA)4 to 
foreign law.  
  
                                                                                                                 
* William Benjamin Wynne Professor of Law, The University of Texas School of Law, 
Austin, Texas.  
** The material printed herein is a cleaned-up transcript of the talk Professor Sampson 
delivered at the Symposium. 
1. ROBERT LAWSON, BEN AND ME: AN ASTONISHING LIFE OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN BY HIS 
GOOD MOUSE AMOS (1939). 
2. From 2003 through 2007 Professors Bob Spector and Jack Sampson served as “expert 
members” of the U. S. State Department delegation to The Hague Conference on Private 
International Law for the negotiation of the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the 
International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance [the new 
Maintenance Convention]. 
3. Ms. DeHart, a child support enforcement lawyer with the Office of the California 
Attorney General, has been the leading advocate for enforcing international child support 
orders since at least the 1980’s. For several years in the 1990’s she led U.S. State 
Department delegations to foreign countries in negotiating bilateral agreements. Professor 
Spector accompanied her on two of those trips as a delegate. She also attended all of the 
sessions for the new convention, stretching over five years, as an observer for the 
International Bar Association, and participated fully in the discussions.  
4. Various versions of UIFSA may be found by following hyperlinks from the NCCUSL 
website, at http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Interstate%20Family%20Support%20Act 
%20Amendments%20(2008) 
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B. Undermining Kulko at Home 
I now turn to the subject of my talk, “Undermining Kulko ….”5 When you 
think about jurisdiction and family law, the most typical case likely to present 
a jurisdictional challenge is a middle class divorce suit between parties with 
kids living in separate states (or nations). In such a case, different rules of 
jurisdiction affect what the parties want. In general there are five things such 
a couple is likely to seek: (1) divorce; (2) property division; (3) alimony: (4) 
child custody; and (5) child support. Students and attorneys turn to the law to 
learn about jurisdiction for obtaining those objectives. For each of these 
objectives there are one or more different jurisdictional rules. When I tell law 
students this, they say “I'm amazed...that's crazy.” I tell lawyers and they say 
“Damn, I wish I'd taken conflict of laws when I was in school.” And when I 
talk to judges and they say--well, they don’t say anything-- they just shake 
their heads in, what I interpret as despair.  
My talk, however, does not cover all five of the objectives in a typical 
divorce; it only addresses the jurisdictional rules applicable to child support 
and alimony orders. In Kulko v. Superior Court, the U.S. Supreme Court 
essentially held that the State of California, in employing its jurisdictional 
statute, reached out its long arm too far. The Court reversed the case 
because it reasoned that under the facts it was inappropriate for California 
to assert personal jurisdcition over the father of the children.  
I will recount those facts very briefly. The parties had divorced and lived 
in separate states. The mother lived in California, and the father and the two 
children initially lived in New York. One of the children, the daughter 
(about 12), wanted to go live with the mother. This was fine with the father, 
who bought her a “one-way plane ticket” and sent her on her way. Later the 
second child (a boy about 14) went to California in a less straightforward 
manner. It seems this time the mother sent the child an airplane ticket and 
somehow he went to California There was no mention of exactly how he 
traveled to the airport, or boarded the plane by himself with the ticket the 
mother had furnished. Perhaps airlines were less attentive in those days, 
although that probably is a stretch (my guess is Dad happily drove him to 
the N.Y. airport—pure speculation). 
These facts were found by the California courts to be sufficient to bind 
the father to their child support order, as well as to modify the original 
order. But these facts were not satisfactory to the majority of the Court in a 
6-3 decision. And, Justice Marshall provided a relatively long list of 
                                                                                                                 
5. Kulko v. Cal. Superior Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 98 S. Ct. 1690 (1978). 
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reasons why personal jurisdiction was lacking over the New York father. A 
full discussion of those reasons is beyond the scope of this particular talk, 
so I will not say more about them other than to note that the Court found 
under the uniform act involved, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act (URESA) and its revised version (RURESA), the facts did not 
identify sufficient contacts with California for the Court to conclude the 
father knowingly was submitting to California jurisdiction.6 The California 
statute, as applied, accorded the deciding court virtually unlimited 
discretion because it granted jurisdiction “on any basis not inconsistent with 
the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” In other words, notice 
of the the reach of the long arm statute was provided only to the judge and 
not to the litigants. 
More fundamentally, the Court further reasoned that because the 
litigation involved a child support order, personal jurisdiction was a 
requirement. Cynically it could be argued this was because a child support 
order is for hard cash, rather than a status order involving such relatively 
mundane matters as custody and visitation. Arguably a trial court should 
not be able to fashion a child support order willy-nilly as they can with 
uncontested divorce cases 
The major response to Kulko was for the Uniform Law Conference to 
draft another uniform act. Although it took more than a decade to 
formulate, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, UIFSA (1992), 
replaced URESA and RURESA, which had become old and tired after 
being in place for over forty years, and had never worked as well as was 
hoped. In any event, the Commissioners decided to start over. As an aside, I 
became a co-reporter in 1990 and joined in the effort to draft UIFSA thanks 
to presenting an argument to the drafting committee that URESA needed a 
long-arm provision in order to undermine Kulko, indeed to get rid of Kulko 
and effectively make it a nonentity in family law. Of course, when 
addressing a constitutional decision by the Supreme Court through a new 
uniform state law the drafting must be done within the confines of the 
framework established by the Court. So despite my hyperbole, UIFSA 
should not be labled as an attempt to “overrule” Kulko. Rather, it was 
                                                                                                                 
6. The classic summary is that Mr. Justice Marshall, held that: (1) acquiescence of 
divorced father who was a New York resident in his daughter's desire to live with her mother 
in California did not confer jurisdiction over divorced father in California courts in divorced 
mother's action to establish foreign judgment of divorce and to modify such judgment so as 
to award her child custody; (2) divorced father did not derive financial benefit as a result of 
his acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live in California with her mother so as to 
warrant California court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction over divorced father, and (3) 
basic considerations of fairness pointed decisively to New York as proper forum for 
adjudication of divorced mother's action to establish foreign judgment of divorce. 
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designed to change the law in such a way to achieve the desired goal of 
creating enforceable interstate child support orders by meeting the elements 
of the tests for personal jurisdiction the Supreme Court established in that 
case. To see how UIFSA achieves this, a quick review of the uniform law is 
appropriate to identify what it does. In short, the long-arm formulation was 
significantly expanded to create a particularized list of activities in orsder to 
sustain claims of personal jurisdiction. The nonparticularized version of 
California law was a major reason that the Supreme Court found that law 
wanting. So in drafting UIFSA the drafters created a list of specified acts to 
enable a state to assert personal jurisdiction over an absent support obligor. 
The following relatively short list, found in UIFSA section 201, totally 
undermines Kulko. UIFSA allows a state to exercise personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident if:  
(1) the individual is personally served with [citation, summons, notice] 
within this state;  
(2) the individual submits to the jurisdiction of the state by consent in a 
record, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive 
document having the effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction;  
(3) the individual resided with the child in the state;  
(4) the individual resided in the state and provided prenatal expenses or 
support for the child;  
(5) the child resides in the state as a result of the acts or directives of the 
individual;  
(6) the individual engaged in sexual intercourse in the state and the child 
may have been conceived by that act of intercourse;  
(7) [the individual asserted parentage of a child in the putative father 
registry maintained in the state by the [appropriate agency]; or  
(8)] there is any other basis consistent with the constitutions of the state 
and the United States for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.7 
Note that Subdivision (5) on the particularized list asserts that if a parent 
undertakes actions or directive that have an effect of causing a child to 
reside in another state, that provides a basis for the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction by the state where the child resides. Not surprisingly, this 
sounds apporximately identical to the facts involved in Kulko.  
In sum, the approach of UIFSA is to concede the correctness of the 
Supreme Court rationale, that is, it is necessary for a court to have personal 
jurisdiction in order to create, enforce, and to modify an order for child 
support. As an aside, the rest of the world disagrees with this conclusion, 
                                                                                                                 
7. UNIF. INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 201, 9.IB U.L.A. 35 (2008), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uifsa/UIFSA_Final_08.pdf. 
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which will be briefly discussed infra. In essence UIFSA is a very 
comprehensive uniform act. In fact, it is comprehensive enough and popular 
enough to be in force in every U.S. jurisdiction, something very unusual for 
a unifom act, albeit currently present in one of three versions, i.e., 1996, 
2001, or 2008. 
What makes the extreme popularity of UIFSA understandable is that the 
U.S. Congress has stated, in effect,  that if the state governments want 
millions of dollars in subsidies to enforce child support orders, the state 
legislatures must pass UIFSA.8 Congress provides a lot of money for this 
project, and has determined for enforcement of child support to function 
properly across state lines the only way it's going to work is to be able to 
enforce a New York child support order in California, even though the 
father's only act in that regard was to send a child to California. That action 
is very similar to all sorts of other types of actions that cause personal 
jurisdiction to a person who sets something loose in interstate commerce, 
such as a single insurance policy.9 Thus, if an individual sets a child loose 
in interstate commerce, so to speak, he will be understood to have agreed to 
pay child support where the child resides. The act will cause you to be 
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the recipient state. That's the 
undermining of  Kulko at home, i.e., in the eight different ways in the 
provisions of UIFSA Section 201. 
C. Undermining Kulko Abroad 
The new convention promulgated by the Hague Conference on 
International Private Law to enforce child support across international 
                                                                                                                 
8. The relevant federal law, known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f), states, 
(f) Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. In order to satisfy section 
654(20)(A) of this title, on and after January 1, 1998, each State must have in 
effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved by the American 
Bar Association on February 9, 1993, and as in effect on August 22, 1996, 
including any amendments officially adopted as of such date by the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 
Id. 
In fact, UIFSA (2001) conforms to the law thanks to waivers routinely granted by the 
Office of Child Support Enforcement, Administration of Children and Families (ACF), 
HHS. See http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cse/index.html. The plan is for the revised 
version of UIFSA (2008), which takes the new Hague Convention into account, will be 
substituted in new federal enabling legislation in order to put the convention into force. See 
Symposium on International Enforcement of Child Support, 43 FAM. L. Q. passim (Spring 
2009). 
9. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). Admittedly the Kulko opinion cited 
McGee, but did not acknowledge the analogy. 
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borders was signed on its day of promulgation by only one country, the 
United States. This was the first step in the long, tortuous procedure of 
putting a treaty into effect in the United States. The current status of the 
Convention of  23 November 2007 on the International Recovery of Child 
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance is found in the Appendix 
to this transcript. 
UIFSA initially did not give much thought to international issues in its 
original 1992 version. For the 1996 version, drafted a short four years later, 
Gloria DeHart was invited to the table. Her interest was to correct that 
oversight and have the interstate act begin to take into account international 
orders. Ultimately, she persuaded the U.S. State Department, the Uniform 
Law Commission, and Congress to deal with international support orders as 
well as interstate orders. 
That interest progressed steadily from 1996 to 2011, where we are now. 
The United States has a number of agreements with other countries on 
international child support enforcement. Individual states have agreements 
with foreign countries, which is also authorized. For example, decades ago 
Texas made an agreement with Germany to enforce German orders, and 
Germany has responded by enforcing Texas orders. That’s the system now, 
but not an ideal method. The new Hague Convention posits there ought to 
be a universal international agreement.10 The U.S. Senate has already given 
its advice and consent, contingent on a number of factors. When the new 
convention does go into effect it will be via state law. In this process 
Congress will say “pass UIFSA 2008” which is written to incorporate not 
just the current way of doing things, but also the future way of doing things.  
The last thing to explain is why Kulko must be undermined abroad as 
well to make the system function. This is necessary internationally because, 
lo and behold, the United States is the only country that requires personal 
jurisdiction to establish, enforce, and modify child support obligations of a 
parent. What is needed to answer the jurisdictional question to establish and 
enforce child support in virtually all other countries is “does the child live 
here?” That's not our way, so in the new maintenance convention other 
countries have agreed that we can do it our way, and we have agreed that 
they can do it their way. Now the little wrinkle here is that when other 
countries establish child support, we accept that process with a stipulation, 
to wit, the other country must have acted under the required fact situations 
that would yield personal jurisdiction under U. S. law.11 U.S. child support 
orders sent to other nations certainly should not have any problem with 
                                                                                                                 
10. The Convention is not exactly new since its fourth birthday is November 23, 2011. 
11. The most readily available explanation of this complex drafting challenge is found in 
the Symposium issue cited in supra note 7, at 139-58. 
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being enforced. Even though we require personal jurisdiction, in virtually 
every case the child support order will come from a forum where the 
obligor or the child reside. Obviously the person seeking child support is 
almost always the individual who has actual custody of the child. It can be 
agreed it is virtually unheard of for an obligee to seek to obtain child 
support order when the child is living with someone else in another country, 
or the obligor is not living in the forum. Similarly, in foreign countries it's 
virtually certain that there will be same direct contact between the parties 
and the forum because UIFSA takes such a broad view of what constitutes 
personal jurisdiction. This broad view will be found in the facts in France, 
Germany, or whatever other country is actually bound by the convention. 
Those facts will fit our system of finding the contacts which warrant the 
establishment and enforcement of the child support order (or other order of 
family maintenance). 
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APPENDIX A 
A Status Update Regarding Ratification of the Hague Convention on the 
International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family 
Maintenance* 
United States  
 
Submitted by Vicki Turetsky in August 2010 and updated October 12, 2010  
Commissioner  
Office of Child Support Enforcement  
US Department of Health and Human Services  
Washington, DC  
 
The United States signed the Hague Convention on the International Recovery 
of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance on November 23, 2007, 
moments after its adoption by The Hague Conference on Private International Law. 
The U.S. was the first country to sign, signaling the executive branch’s intention to 
bring the treaty into force under U.S. domestic law. Since then major steps have 
been taken.  
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) was determined to be the 
most effective mechanism of integrating the Convention into state law. First 
promulgated seventeen years ago, UIFSA has been enacted in every state, pursuant 
to the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 666(f). It is well understood by judges, lawyers, 
and child support professionals and already addresses some international child 
support matters. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, also known as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), had been engaged in 
Convention discussions and agreed to draft UIFSA amendments for the limited 
purpose of implementing Convention requirements. The ULC drafting committee 
welcomed active participation by many child support professionals, including the 
Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE) and the Department of State. Acting 
on an expedited basis, the ULC Commissioners approved the UIFSA amendments 
in July 2008. The American Bar Association’s House of Delegates approved 
UIFSA 2008 in February 2009.  
Implementing legislation, including updating the UIFSA mandate in federal law 
to UIFSA 2008, was submitted to the Congress soon after the ULC acted. On 
September 8, 2008, President Bush transmitted the Convention to the Senate asking 
for its advice and consent to ratification. The Conference of Chief Justices, the 
Conference of Court Administrators, ULC, ABA, NCSEA, and other child support 
                                                                                                                 
* NCSEA CHILD SUPPORT COMMUNIQUE January 2011 Message (HTML) www.NCSEA. 
org. 
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organizations urged approval. Over the next year, OCSE and State Department 
staff conducted several briefings for Foreign Relations Committee staff.  
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing on the Convention 
on October 6, 2009. Mr. Keith Loken, Assistant Legal Adviser, Department of 
State; the Honorable Battle Robinson, Uniform Law Commissioner and Retired 
Judge in the Family Court of Delaware; Ms. Alisha Griffin, Assistant Director, 
Office of Child Support Services, New Jersey Department of Human Services; and 
I were among those testifying. On November 17, 2009, the Committee voted to 
approve the Convention. 
On September 29, 2010, the United States Senate approved the Resolution of 
Advice and Consent regarding the Hague Convention on the International 
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance.  
Now that the full Senate has taken action, the following additional steps must 
occur before the Treaty can enter into force for the United States:  
The Congress must adopt, and there must be enacted, implementing legislation 
for the Treaty. The Department of Health and Human Services already has 
submitted draft implementing legislation and will provide support in moving that 
legislation forward.  
Pursuant to the implementing legislation, all states must enact UIFSA 2008 by 
the effective date noted in the legislation. The draft legislation currently gives 
states two years to pass new state laws. In addition, the draft legislation requires 
states to make minor revisions to the state plan.  
The President must sign the instrument of ratification for the Treaty.  
Finally, after all these activities are completed, the United States will be able to 
deposit its instrument of ratification with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands, which is the depositary for the Treaty.  
If at least one other country has deposited its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance or approval, the Treaty will enter into force for the United States on the 
first day of the first month that is not less than three months after the date of the 
U.S. deposit. If the United States is the first country to deposit its instrument, the 
Treaty will enter into force on the first day of the first month that is not less than 
three months after a second country deposits its instrument. 
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